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WHY EQUALITY MATTERS*
Kenneth L. Karst**
I. EQUALITY: FROM FORM TO SUBSTANCE
The ideal of equality is one of the great themes in the culture of
American public life. From the Declaration of Independence to the
Pledge of Allegiance, the rhetoric of equality permeates our sym-
bols of nationhood. Over and over in our history, from the earliest
colonial beginnings, equality has been a rallying cry, a promise, an
article of national faith. So it is that the ideal of equality touches
our emotions. All these aspects of equality-protest, hope, and
faith, infused with emotion-came together on an August after-
noon now almost two decades past, when Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., spoke to an enormous multitude at the Washington Monu-
ment, repeatedly returning to the same words: "I have a dream."
The metaphor of the dream was Dr. King's way of making vivid
the contrast between the American Constitution's promise of
equality and the realities of race relations in 1963. One of the ma-
jor facts of life in our nation-as, indeed, in every human group
that can be called a nation-has always been inequality. Yet the
theme of equality retains great power not merely as a "protest
ideal" or a disguise for privilege but as an appropriate name for
the goals of hardheaded reformers. Martin Luther King may have
been a dreamer, but he knew how to get down to cases, from segre-
* The John A. Sibley Lecture in Law delivered at the University of Georgia School of
Law on October 28, 1982, revised and expanded for publication.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. I am grateful for the careful
and caring readings of an earlier draft of this paper by these colleagues at UCLA and else-
where: Gregory Alexander, Harold Bruff, Catherine Hancock, Gary Schwartz, Steven Shif-
frin, Jonathan Varat, and Peter Westen.
I G. SARToRi, DiommcRic THEORY 326-27 (1962).
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gated buses to voting rights.
The 1960's were the years when the Supreme Court rapidly ex-
tended the domain of the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion of the laws. The inevitable political attack on Brown v. Board
of Education2 and the Court's later egalitarian decisions was soon
complemented by attack from the academy. Herbert Wechsler
found the Brown opinion unprincipled,3 and Raoul Berger charac-
terized the decision as a usurpation of power, contrary to the pur-
poses of the Congress that proposed the fourteenth amendment.4
Alexander Bickel was more sympathetic, but ultimately more un-
kind, suggesting that the Warren Court's decisions on school segre-
gation and legislative reapportionment would ultimately be seen to
be irrelevant to the issues they had addressed.5 All these criticisms
seem to me to be misconceived, as I have argued previously.0 But a
more fundamental criticism, which has lately received forceful new
statement, calls for a radical restriction of the reach of any consti-
tutional principle of equality.
This criticism is more than a rejection of Warren Court egalitari-
anism; it is a rejection of the very idea of equality as a constitu-
tional norm. The argument begins with the recognition that equal-
ity, pure and simple, can be reduced to a formal abstraction-the
idea that like cases should be treated alike. To make sense of any
claim to equality, one must connect that claim to some substantive
value. But substantive values compete with one another; thus the
rhetoric of equality, as Philip Kurland remarked in a 1969 lecture,
"is subject to use, if not capture, by anyone on any side of the
question."7 In a challenging recent article, Peter Westen has made
this point the centerpiece in a comprehensive assault on the use of
equality as a principle for guiding either moral discourse or consti-
tutional decisions. His conclusion is summarized in his title: The
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARM. L. REV. 1, 31-34
(1959).
4 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY 243-45, passim (1977).
8 A. BicKEL, THE SuPRaE COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 116-73 (1970).
6 See Karst, Constitutional Equality and the Role of the Judiciary, in The Promise of
American Politics: Principles and Practice After 200 Years (R. Utley ed.) (to be published)
[hereinafter cited as Karst, Constitutional Equality]; Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv,
1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Karst, Equal Citizenship].
7 P. KURLAND, PoLrrcs, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 165 (1970).
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Empty Idea of Equality.8
Professor Westen demonstrates that any claim to equality can be
restated as a claim of some substantive right. If equality means
treating like cases alike, then we need standards for measurement,
that is, substantive rules for deciding which persons are alike, and
what amounts to treating them alike. Once we get that far, he ar-
gues, the idea of equality is no longer needed; it just confuses our
thinking, which would be clearer if we forgot about what he calls
the "derivative" idea of equality and directly confronted the ques-
tion whether a particular substantive right ought to be recognized.
It bears emphasis that Professor Westen is not merely making a
point about economy in philosophical argumentation. He is saying
we should drop the rhetoric of equality right out of our constitu-
tional law. 10 To dramatize this proposal, he refers to the motto
"Equal Justice Under Law," carved in stone above the pillars of
the Supreme Court building, and he poses this rhetorical question:
"Would the phrase mean less if it said, 'Justice Under Law'?"'"
Yes, it would. Perhaps, on that well-known desert island popu-
lated by philosophers, the form of the motto would make little dif-
ference. But our Supreme Court and our constitutional law must
serve our nation, with our history, our values, our social structure,
our governmental institutions, and our sense of a common destiny.
In the America where we live, equality matters.
But the equality that matters in our Supreme Court is not the
simple abstraction that likes should be treated alike. It is the
equality guaranteed in the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment and elsewhere in the Constitution. That consti-
tutional equality draws on an egalitarian ideal that has evolved
from the colonial era to our own time. The equal citizenship princi-
ple that is the core of the fourteenth amendment does have sub-
stantive content, and, to be sure, that content is properly stated in
the form of a right. It is the presumptive right "to be treated by
the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating
* Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. Rsv. 537 (1982).
* Id. at 548-50.10 Id. at 542. "Equality... is an idea that should be banished from moral and legal
discourse as an explanatory norm." Id. For Professor Westen's application of this precept to
American constitutional law, see id. at 559-92.
21 Id. at 558.
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member.' 1 2 Every individual is thus presumptively entitled to
treatment in our public life as a person, one who deserves respect,
one who belongs to our national community. The principle is pre-
sumptively violated when the organized society treats someone as
an inferior, as part of a dependent caste, or as a nonparticipant.
The chief citizenship value is respect; the chief harm against which
the principle guards is degradation or the imposition of stigma. A
citizen is a participant in the moral community, someone who
counts in the community's processes of decision. And a citizen is
responsible to the community, with obligations to it and its other
members. The values of participation and responsibility contribute
to an individual's self-respect, but they also have independent sig-
nificance in a political tradition that emphasizes not only doing
but belonging."3
This formulation of the principle of equal citizenship does not
use the language of equality. But implicit in the values of citizen-
ship-and especially the primary value of respect-is the notion of
equal membership in the community. For it is precisely the denial
of equal status, the treatment of someone as an inferior, that
causes stigmatic harm. Erving Goffman, in his profound little book
on the subject, shows how stigmatization is a process by which we
12 This is my own formulation. Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 6, at 4. The princi-
ple of equal citizenship is not a rule for judicial decision, but a general principle that in-
forms decision by centering a court's attention on the substantive values of respect, respon-
sibility, and participation. Equal citizenship is no absolute; nor does our constitutional
rhetoric of equality produce "monolithic" judicial scrutiny of legislation, as suggested in
Westen, supra note 8, at 585. Indeed, Justice Stevens, concurring in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 211-12 (1976), called for an attitude exactly opposite to absolutism: one of interest
balancing, weighing other considerations against the claim of constitutional equality. What
is required is a serious effort to justify governmental imposition of inequalities, in propor.
tion to the degree of invasion of the values of equal citizenship. The critical point for our
purposes is that those values, i.e., respect, responsibility, and participation, take the claim to
equality out of the realm of empty formalism and into a flesh-and-blood society where
equality matters.
13 The sense of belonging, in fact, is the foundation of civil responsibility. In 1948, in a
speech about President Franklin Roosevelt, Justice Douglas summed up this relation in
words of telling simplicity.
"The sense of belonging is important to man. The feeling that he is accepted and part
of the community or the nation is as important as the feeling that he is a member of
a family. He does not belong if he has second-class citizenship. When he feels he does
not belong, he is not eager to assume responsibilities of citizenship. Being unan.
chored, he is easy prey to divisive influences that are designed to tear a nation apart
D. PoTvrR, PEOPLE OF PLENTY 105 n.8 (1954) (quoting Justice William 0. Douglas).
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(the so-called "normals") differentiate them (the stigmatized) from
us, setting them apart and treating them as not quite human.1'
Stigma dissolves the human ties we call "acceptance" and excludes
the stigmatized from "belonging" as equals. Stigma represents the
breakdown of empathy.
From this perspective, we can see that it is the imposition of this
status inequality itself that is harmful. If we were to recast this
constitutional claim to equality in the language of substantive
right, we might speak of the right not to be stigmatized by the
organized community. But that is just another name for the right
to be "treated as an equal."1 5 The primary substantive claim here
is an objection to inequality-not inequality in the abstract, but a
form of inequality that is inseparable from the substantive harm of
stigma. As a matter of abstract logic, it can be said that even in
this circumstance equality is a derivative concept, and that the
constitutional claim in question can be reduced to a claim to be
free from stigma."6 But if the core meaning of stigma is treating
someone as less than an equal, then the idea of equality is not
merely derivative, but the essence of the substantive claim. When
we are guarding against the stigma of inferiority, it makes excellent
sense to regard equality as the constitutional rhetoric of choice.
The premise of this Article, then, is that in American public life
and constitutional law the idea of equality carries a meaning quite
removed from the empty tautology that like cases should be
treated alike. This meaning is not derived from dictionaries or de-
ductive logic, but from centuries of American experience. It is not
a philosopher's universal, but a culturally specific and evolving
ideal. 7 The ideal not only has substantive content; it is a cluster of
14 E. GoFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE lMAAGEUEM OF SPOILED IDNrrY 1-9 (1963).
Compare John Hart Ely's "we-they" analysis of the legislative process. Ely, The Constitu-
tionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHL L. Rav. 723, 732-33 (1974); Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933-34 n.79 (1973).
15 This latter formulation has been used in R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIuousLY 227
(1977), and L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONsrrTUoTNAL LAw 993 (1978).
16 See, e.g., Westen, supra note 8, at 582-83; Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law,
Science, Math and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REv. 604 (1983).
17 Professor Westen apparently will have none of this. "The concept of equality is one
and the same in all its usages." Westen, supra note 16, at 607. I take this statement to be a
claim that "equality" can have only one meaning, which is abstract and formal, with no
more and no less content than the "equals" sign in a mathematical equation. But surely it is
at least acceptable to find the meanings of words in the ways they are used, ways that may
vary according to the contexts in which they are uttered. There is nothing wrong with say-
1983]
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substantive values, with moral underpinnings solidly based in a
particular society's religious and philosophical traditions.1 8
Our next task is to consider some of the ways in which the rheto-
ric of equality has been used in our nation's past, with a view to
understanding the emotional force of constitutional equality in the
political culture of today's America. Then we shall look at ways in
which the rhetoric of equality, far from spreading confusion, both
identifies and promotes the values of equal citizenship and helps
lawyers and judges to ask the right questions and reach the right
solutions. This latter inquiry leads us to another essential function
of the idea of constitutional equality: its contribution to a vision of
American society as a community and not merely a collection of
individuals or of disparate groups.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY AS AN AMERICAN IDEAL
The ideal of constitutional equality has a powerful emotional
pull in our country. Some philosophers have said that equality is a
moral axiom, justifying itself, while inequality demands explana-
tion.1 9 If you have three children, and you take them all to a
movie, no one will ask for an explanation. But if you leave one of
ing, "By 'equality' I mean the proposition in law and morals that 'people who are alike
should be treated alike,"' Westen, supra note 8, at 539, and then concluding that equality,
so defined, is "an empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own." Id. at 547.
After all, one who constructs an empty vessel is entitled to point out its emptiness. But the
step from that analytical point to an insistence that all of us abandon the rhetoric of equal.
ity in morals and in law is a "shift from talking about language to talking about the world."
S. CAVLL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 19 (1969). Surely the rest of us are enti-
tled-indeed, equally entitled-to adopt meanings of equality that accord with ordinary
language. When I speak of the utility of the rhetoric of equality in the process of constitu-
tional decision, I am referring to the "ordinary language" of American public life and consti-
tutional law. On ordinary language and meanings, see Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 Anis-
TOTELIAN SOC'Y PROC. 1 (1956-57), reprinted in J.L. AUSTIN, A Plea for Excuses, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 175 (3d ed. 1979).
Is On equality and American religious traditions, see infra notes 29-37 and accompanying
text. Our philosophical traditions concerning equality are, in part, the product of more than
two millennia of Western thought. See generally S. LAKOFF, EQUALITY IN POLITICAL PHILOSO-
PHY (1964). On the religious and philosophical foundations of egalitarian ideals in America,
see W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968); J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1978). The idea of equality is central in the work of two American philosophers of
our own time. See R. DwoRmN, supra note 15; J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
19 See, e.g., R. DWORKiN, supra note 15, at 271-72; Bedau, Egalitarianism and the Idea of
Equality, in 9 NoMos: EQuALITY 3, 19 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1967); Berlin, Equal-
ity as an Ideal, in Jus1icE AND SOCIAL POLICY 128, 130-31, 150 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
[Vol. 17:245250
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them at home, you are expected to have a reason. In fact, the idea
of equality seems to be a vital component of children's early un-
derstanding of justice.2 0 Now, it may be entirely justifiable to leave
one of the children at home. The child may be ill; or you may
think that the movie is unsuitable for the youngest child; or the
oldest child may already have seen the movie, and at your expense,
too. By the time children are teen-agers, they understand that ine-
qualities are often justified.21
Yet it is still true, as Irving Kristol said some years ago, that
"inequality is on the defensive. '22 But a moral axiom is not the
sort of thing that puts fire in anyone's belly. The inequality that
gets us excited 23 is not a lifeless abstraction. In American society
the idea of equality means much more than the formal principle
that likes should be treated alike. The inequality that is on the
defensive in America is the idea of caste, of rigid social hierarchy.
When we see people trapped in a system that treats them as inferi-
ors, our emotions are aroused.
These responses are not merely the result of the egalitarian fer-
vor of the 1960's. The roots of our attachment to the ideals of
equality run deep in our national experience. Taken together, they
amount to a tradition that has force-and therefore utility-in our
own time. I have chosen six themes illustrative of this tradition; of
course, they overlap. What follows is not history-not even "law
office history."' 4 The point is not to invent a new version of the
past, but to illuminate the present. As we examine these historical
uses of the rhetoric of equality, I invite the reader to consider his
or her own intuitive response to them: Do they or do they not ring
true as part of what Americans today accept as our national
2 j. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CmLD 276-95 (1965).
21 Id. at 285. Piaget concludes this passage with the following comment: "Equalitarian
justice develops with age at the expense of submission to adult authority, and in correlation
with solidarity between children. Equalitarianism would therefore seem to come from the
habits of reciprocity peculiar to mutual respect rather than from the mechanism of duties
that is founded upon unilateral respect." Id. at 294-95.
Kristol, Equality as an Ideal, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENcyCLOPE=DA OF SocAL Scmxcxs
108, 110 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
See Plamenatz, Diversity of Rights and Kinds of Equality, in 9 Nomos: EquALrn',
supra note 19, at 79, 82.
24 The term is Alfred Kelly's. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
Sup. CT. REv. 119, 122. Kelly uses the term to refer to "the selection of data favorable to the
position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper eval-




A further caution is in order. America's devotion to ideals of
equality has always been ambivalent. Thomas Jefferson, who
drafted the Declaration of Independence, may have been troubled
about owning slaves, but he was not wholly convinced that black
people were the equals of whites.2  Abraham Lincoln, who signed
the Emancipation Proclamation and wrote the Gettysburg Ad-
dress, found it possible to put in a good word for white
27
supremacy. 6 And the first Justice Harlan, who said the Constitu-
tion was color-blind,27 thought there was a big difference between
legal equality and social equality.2 Despite the perennial appeal of
egalitarian rhetoric, the theme of equality has never been domi-
nant in the American polity. The same people who say they like to
root for the underdog are apt to go to the game and chant "We're
number one!" There are countervailing interests and counter-
vailing ideals that pull us away from the ideal of equality. But our
objective for now is not to decide cases; it is to see what there is in
our collective past that gives the rhetoric of equality its emotional
force. If the long struggle toward constitutional equality be per-
ceived as a contest, then what follows is not so much a one-sided
picture as a picture of one side.
We shall reserve until last the most important theme of all, the
movement for racial equality. Before getting to that subject, we
shall consider American attitudes toward equality as they have
been affected by our traditions of religion, law, and government, by
our ideology of social mobility, and by our experience as a nation
of immigrants.
A. The Legacy of Religious Dissent
Many of the earliest English settlers came to America in search
of relief from persecution because of their religion. As Calvinists,
they believed in one or another variation on the doctrine of the
priesthood of all believers. There was no room for intermediaries
between the individual and God. Calvinists generally, and espe-
25 See W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 430-40.
26 See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 148 (1974).
27 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" See Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The
Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637, 662-63 (1957).
[Vol. 17:245
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cially Puritans, carried this idea into their church organization,
which was congregational, not hierarchical. 29 And, although they
plainly did not use the same principle for organizing civil govern-
ment, their religion did teach them that all persons were equally
created in God's image and equally implicated in sin: "In Adam's
fall/We sinned all."30 Every society, they taught, was bound to-
gether by a series of covenants, both implicit and explicit. Thus
every individual had obligations of varying intensity to other mem-
bers of spiritual, ecclesiastical, and political communities-and ul-
timately to all human beings and to God.31 "The brotherhood of
man" today seems an advertising slogan; to a conscientious Puritan
in seventeenth-century Massachusetts it was a central article of
faith.
Brotherhood did not, however, imply political democracy. John
Winthrop, the Puritan governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony,
was something of an autocrat; he opposed a thoroughgoing democ-
racy because he feared that factionalism would destroy the com-
munity on which brotherhood was based.32 Winthrop was ready to
accept wide disparities in wealth and power among individuals, but
he also expressed satisfaction that New Englanders were on their
way to achieving more equality in dignity than were the members
of other communities. s Half a century later, the congregational
minister John Wise reformulated the same idea: each person was
entitled to equal consideration when public policy was made-and
he explicitly differentiated between equal treatment, which was
not required, and equal consideration, which was."
It is well known that the Puritans in Massachusetts, who had
fled religious intolerance in England, themselves showed little tol-
erance for dissent. Indeed, the political movement for religious
"See P. MIa, THE NEw ENGLAND MIND: THE SEvENTEENTH CENTURY 432-62 (1939); R.
PERRY, PURITANISM D DEMocRAcy 104-10, 192-97 (1944); see also hM HowE, TE GARDEN
AND THE WiLDERNEss: RELIGION AND GovERNMENT IN .AMEcAN CONSTIuriONAL HISTonY 32-
62 (1965).
0 NEW-ENGLAND PRIMER (Boston 1727); see also I. HARRIs, THE QUESr FOR EQUALrry 11
(1960); W.C. McWiuas, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY iN AMEcA 128 (1973); P. Mn.LER,
supra note 29, at 254-62.
s See W. HALLER, THE RISE OF PURITANISM 128-72 (1938); W.C. McWmuAs, supra note
30, at 123-32.
2W.C. McWauLALs, supra note 30, at 137-38.
"Id. at 142.
See IL HARRIS, supra note 30, at 13; W.C. McWLmS. supra note 30, at 162.
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freedom in the United States can be said to have commenced with
the banishment of Roger Williams from Massachusetts and the
founding of Providence in the 1630's.15 Baptists and Presbyterians
saw themselves, to use today's language, as oppressed minorities
and even used the language of slavery to express their opposition
to paying taxes to support an established church that was not their
own.3 In this effort the minority churches of New England were
aided by the Quakers of Pennsylvania. 7 The Society of Friends
has had a long and distinguished history of devotion to the ideals
of liberty and equal human dignity, including an important role in
the early antislavery movement. Thus the themes of respect, re-
sponsibility, and participation were sounded from the earliest colo-
nial beginnings in both the organization and doctrines of America's,
strongest and most vital churches.
B. Legal Equality
It is not quite a tautology to refer to equal laws. For most of
human history it would have been wrong to assume that legal rules
applied generally to all members of a given society. The idea of
universally applicable laws is a product of the post-feudal world.38
Even in modern times, in those countries whose social and eco-
nomic affairs most resemble feudalism, it is not much of an exag-
geration to say that the law effectively governing an individual's
rights and obligations-and, especially, privileges-is very much
the product of his personal status. 9
Feudalism never quite took hold in America, despite the exis-
See R. HARRuS, supra note 30, at 12; W.C. MCWILLUMS, supra note 30, at 144-49. The
literal exclusion of Williams from community membership dramatizes the struggle of reli.
gious dissenters to "belong." It was Williams who originated Jefferson's metaphor of the
wall of separation between church and state; Williams wanted the wall to prevent "the wil-
derness" of the world from corrupting "the garden" of the church. See M. HOwE, supra note
29, at 5-6.
36 See B. BAi.YN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 270 (1967).
Id. at 268-69.
" The idea derives from the "social contract" theory of sovereignty, as propounded by
such writers as Hobbes and Locke. It culminates in the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau. See,
e.g., J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. 11, ch. 4 (H. Tozer trans. 1898), reprinted in
READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 645-48 (F. Coker rev. ed. 1938). Locke insisted on "one
rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court, and the country man at plough." J. LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. XI, § 142 (1690).
3, For examples in southern Asia, see G. MvsDAL, ASIAN DRApA passim (1968). See also
K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELoPMENT IN LATIN AMEmCA 57-66, 629-710 (1975).
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tence of huge landed estates in several colonies and even one abor-
tive effort to plant a truly feudal system in the soil of Maryland.' 0
Even the guilds failed to prosper in colonial towns.41 A system of
legal hierarchy-that is, of more or less permanent privileges
founded on law-was contrary to the animating spirit of most colo-
nial societies. By custom, and in contravention of English law,
some of the colonies, even before the Revolution, had abandoned
primogeniture. 42 The entailment of land remained permissible dur-
ing the colonial era, but the practice appears not to have been
widespread.43 In any case, both entail and primogeniture were for-
mally abandoned by post-Revolutionary times, to the accompani-
ment of antifeudal and egalitarian rhetoric.4 Land ownership, like
other private wealth, was submitted to the forces of the market.
More generally, the American colonists resisted the idea of legal
privileges attached to personal status. They bitterly resented ine-
qualities imposed upon them because of their colonial status.
Throughout the later eighteenth century they insisted on the
rights of Englishmen.45 After independence, first the Articles of
Confederation and then the Constitution expressly prohibited both
the states and the national government from creating titles of no-
bility.4" Most of the new state constitutions contained guarantees
41 See L. F tDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 53-54 (1974). On the failure of feudal
institutions and ideas in America, see generally L. HAmz, THE LmnAL TA~MoN IN
AMERCA 3-32 (1955).
41 Indeed, even in England by the early 17th century the common law courts had broken
the monopolies of the guilds. See J. COMMONS, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPrASM 225-
28 (1939).
42 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 57-58. Primogeniture was the system of the English
common law for keeping feudal estates intact. When a landowner died without a will, all his
lands went to his eldest son.
4' The doctrine of entail allowed the owner of land, by will, to pass it intact through
several succeeding generations, preventing his son, for example (and the son's son, etc.),
from selling or leasing the property. On the absence of evidence of widespread use of entail,
see Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era,
76 MicH. L. REv. 1, 13, 26 (1977).
" See id. passim.
45 See B. BAILYN, supra note 36, at 175-98; B. BAiLYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMCAN PoLmcs
3-58 (1968); E. MORGAN, THE BIoTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89, at 61-76 (rev. ed. 1977); G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AME-ICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 3-45 (1969).
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cL 8; U.S. ARTS. OF CONFEDERT ION art. VI, para. 1 (1777). On
the relation of the constitutional clause to the competing ideals of equality of opportunity
and equality of condition, see Note, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Medioc-
rity?, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1850, 1858-62 (1981).
By a similar logic of equal opportunity, the Constitution forbade both the Congress and
19831
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of equal rights or prohibitions against the granting of special
privileges.47
The nineteenth century accelerated the attack on special legal
privilege 48 and the abandonment of legal rights based on a person's
status in favor of a universal body of law, equally applicable
throughout the society. The abolition of slavery, the Reconstruc-
tion civil rights laws, and the Civil War amendments were specifi-
cally aimed at destroying the links between race and legal rights,
but they were also part of a larger pattern of breakdown of legal
inequalities based on personal status. The process continues ii our
own time, with the civil rights movement and attacks on other
forms of status discrimination embodied in a system of unequal
laws. Who would say a good word for legal inequality today?
The idea of one law for all has an appeal not only for the average
citizen, but also for a leader who seeks to unify a people. In the
sixth century, Justinian wanted a single law to unite a revived Ro-
man Empire;49 Napoleon wanted one law for all Frenchmen, partly
by way of cementing the union of France.50 The bulk of American
law since independence has been state law, not national law. Yet it
has also made sense to speak of an American common law, from
the days of the commentaries of Joseph Story and James Kent to
the days of the Restatement of the Law. 1 And if today we have
any preeminent symbol of our nationhood, it is the Constitution.52
the states to pass bills of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1. A standard
feature of old English bills of attainder had been "attainder of the blood," that is, disabili.
ties imposed on the descendants of the attainted. Neither the privileges of nobility nor the
disabilities of attaint would be inheritable under the Constitution.
47 For samples of the language chosen, see R. HARRis, supra note 30, at 18-19. For a
discussion of the "radical" Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, see G. WOOD, supra note 45,
at 226-37. See generally B. BAmYN, supra note 36, at 272-301.
48 Corporate privileges in particular were the target of the egalitarian rhetoric of the
Democratic Party. See generally R. WELTER, THE MIND OF AmERicA, 1820-1860, at 77-104
(1975). A famous victory for the attackers was Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
49 Justinian's objective was aptly characterized: "one emperor, one church and one law."
H. WOLFF, ROMAN LAW 163 (1951).
11 See Limpens, Territorial Expansion of the Code, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND TiE
COMMON-LAw WORLD 92, 104 (B. Schwartz ed. 1956).
81 On the early commentaries, see L. FIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 282-92. On modern
movements toward unification of American law, see id. at 580-83; Goodrich, Restatement
and Codification, in DAvW DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 241 (A. Reppy ed. 1949);
Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147 (1969).81 "The great issues of American politics through the Civil War in the 19th century and
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The motto "Equal Justice Under Law" not only rejects the idea of
special legal privilege; it also proclaims our shared membership in
a nation.
C. The People and Their Governors
The basic meaning of what we now call the "rule of law" is that
the officers of government, as well as the people, must obey the
law.53 The same Declaration of Independence that proclaimed all
men equal also asserted that governments derive "their just powers
from the consent of the governed." In the American Colonies, long
before the Revolution, the idea that government was founded on a
social contract was not merely a logical deduction from a spiritual
covenant or a theory of natural rights; in many communities it was
an accomplished historical fact." The Mayflower Compact was the
most celebrated example and served as a model for other commu-
nities; its origins are instructive. Governor William Bradford wrote
that when the Pilgrims were on the high seas, headed for the place
they would call Plymouth, the Compact was "occasioned partly by
the discontented and mutinous speeches that some of the strangers
amongst them had let fall from them in the ship: that when they
came ashore they would use their own liberty, for none had power
to command them."55 The New World seemed to its new inhabi-
tants to be a place where the philosophers' hypothetical "state of
nature" was real enough.56 Indeed, seventeenth-century America
was a scene Thomas Hobbes would have appreciated.5 7
The Mayflower Compact turned out to be the basis for a highly
authoritarian government; in Jamestown the people in their "state
the New Deal in the 20th would be cast in legal language-the sacred test of 'constitutional-
ity'-precisely because Americans saw the revered legal framework as the skeleton on which
the community had grown." D. BoonsTIN, THE AmmCAs: THn COLONIAL ExPCE=Nc 205
(1958).
53 See A. DicEy, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION IXXVii,
202-03 (10th ed. 1959). The favorable popular reception of the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), suggests the modem vitality of this idea.
"For two New England examples, see R ARuz PnovmE cns: 1600-1760, at 53-56,
192 (J. Demos ed. 1972). On the social contract theory in the Revolutionary era, see G.
WOOD, supra note 45, at 268-91, 600-02.
RmARKABLE PRovmNc= 1600-1760, supra note 54, at 8-9 (quoting Governor William
Bradford).
"See id. at 8-9 (on the "atmosphere of dog-eat-dog competitiveness").
" See T. HoBBS, L mTHAn 63-66 (1914 & photo. reprint 1979) (1st ed. London 1651)
(on the "warre of every man against every man.").
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of nature" chose a dictatorial government to rescue them from
chaos."8 But the point is that the people did choose. In New Eng-
land, the town meeting soon took its place as the secular counter-
part of the congregational government of churches. The fact that
Britain in the seventeenth century was in the throes of revolution-
ary upheaval increased the practical power of the colonists to gov-
ern themselves. The most important issue concerning the structure
of colonial governments was the contest between the legislative
and executive power-that is, between the people's elected repre-
sentatives and the Crown's appointed governors. " Much of the
rhetoric of revolution centered on this continuing contention.6
After independence, some leaders wanted George Washington to
be a king. He summarily rejected the suggestion, and surely even if
he had been receptive, the project would have been impossible.
The country was committed to being a republic. 61 Concerned about
possible excesses of democracy, John Adams proposed that the
First Congress provide for great state ceremonies connected with
the Presidency to create awe among the people. He suggested that
the President should be called "His Most Benign Highness. ' '0 2 Not
too many years ago we had some experience with that sort of thing,
but the whole country just laughed those fancy uniforms right off
the backs of the guards at the White House. Adams's proposal did
not go anywhere, either. Americans think of their government offi-
cials as their servants; we may like glamour, but we are not keen
on majesty.
Today our national political ideology obviously embraces full
participation by competent adults in the process of electing gov-
ernment officials. This ideal of equal participation in voting has
taken a very long time in achieving realization. The nineteenth
amendment, extending the vote to women, was not adopted until
1920. And although racial equality in voting was promised by the
Civil War amendments, redemption of the promise had to await
the civil rights legislation of our own time. For all that, the ideal
did find early expression. What was remarkable about the Ameri-
" See REMARKABLE PROVIDENCES: 1600-1760, supra note 54, at 9.
" See B. BAILYN, supra note 45, at 59-105.
"0 See B. BAILYN, supra note 36, at 22-54.
" See G. WOOD, supra note 45, at 46-90. On equality as a "pervasive constitutional
value," see Laycock, Book Review, 59 TEx. L. REV. 343, 376-93 (1981).
0" Letter to William Tudor (May 3, 1789), quoted in 2 P. SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 755 (1962).
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can Colonies-what Americans thought differentiated them from
Britain-was, in fact, the breadth of the franchise. Even if voting
was restricted to white male property owners, Bernard Bailyn has
estimated that in the late colonial era the number of adult white
males who could qualify to vote ranged from fifty percent in the
more restrictive colonies to seventy-five percent in Rhode Island. 3
From the time the Western states took the lead in establishing
universal suffrage for white males until the modern culmination of
the extension of the franchise, each step along the way was accom-
panied by the rhetoric of equality. From the beginning, Americans
liked to think of themselves as a new people, with new institutions
of government including a flourishing, if limited, political democ-
racy." Reading Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Supreme
Court in the reapportionment case of Reynolds v. Sims,6e one hears
echoes of these sentiments. "One person, one vote" is a modern
reflection of our long-standing attachment to an egalitarian ideal.
D. The Vision of Equal Opportunity
Looking at a list of passengers on an English ship bound for the
American Colonies in the early seventeenth century, a reader can-
not help being struck by the passengers' high degree of social ho-
mogeneity. One such list, dated 1635, includes these occupations:
minister, clothier, salter, chandler, joiner, weaver, tailor, sawyer,
cooper, husbandman, and servant.6 Most of these people traveled
with their families. 7 The environment imposed its own equality on
the earliest settlers; they faced considerable hardships just to sur-
vive, and there was no room for gentle folk. Correspondingly, there
was little reason for the well-to-do to leave England and come to
America. So a rough sort of equality did characterize those first
colonial communities.
Even the settlers who came with next to nothing could, in those
0 B. BAmYN, supra note 45, at 86-88. Bailyn also points out that apathy significantly
reduced the number of actual voters. Id. at 88.
"Plainly the framers of the Constitution did not want to establish "simple democracy."
See G. WOOD, supra note 45, at 222-26. But a significant measure of democracy was implicit
in the colonial idea of a republic. See B. BAiLYN, supra note 36, at 282-84. On the expansion
of the franchise in the 19th century, see R. WELTER, supra note 48, at 165-89.
" 377 U.S. 533 (1964).




early days, occupy land and earn a living from it. From the outset,
though, there was something of a social hierarchy; it was no acci-
dent that the minister's name came first on that passenger list. In
the natural course of working and trading, too, some were more
successful than others; soon there were social rankings to match
differences in wealth and income. And the population grew at an
astounding rate. In 1620, there were about 2,500 English settlers in
America; within fifty years the number exceeded 100,000.8 By
1800, there were four and a half million whites and a million black
slaves s.6 By then, land in the territory of the original Colonies was
no longer freely available; vast portions of it were concentrated in
the estates of certain great families, not merely in the plantation
economies of the South, but in the North as well.7 0 As the exis-
tence of almshouses and poor laws7 1 showed, there was already a
significant body of people called "poor." By the end of the colonial
period, the poor had congregated in the largest cities. Estimates of
their numbers run from one-quarter to one-third of the white pop-
ulation of the Northern Colonies.7 12 Indentured servants consti-
tuted more than ten percent of the white population well into the
eighteenth century.73 With the exception of the earliest times,
when no one was "poor" because everyone was suffering, poverty
has been a persistent feature of American society.?
For some people, the answer was to head West to such places as
Kentucky and Ohio, where land was available and life was
hard-much as it had been in the first settlements along the coast.
68 H. APTHEKER, THE COLONIAL ERA 35 (2d ed. 1966).
19 R. NYE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF THE NEW NATION, 1776-1830, at 121 (1960).
70 R. NYE, supra note 69, at 105. Land concentration was not the only obstacle to social
mobility. Commentators on the late colonial era have pointed to middle-class resentment of
an entrenched "establishment," personified by royal governors, that blocked the avenues of
advancement for talented outsiders. John Adams exemplified these feelings. See G. WOOD,
supra note 45, at 79-82, 143-50, 476, 479. On the "subtle and latent" social component of the
Revolution, see Bailyn, Common Sense, in FUNDAMENTAL TESTAMENTS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 7, 19-22 (1973) (containing papers presented at Library of Congress Second
Symposium on the American Revolution, May 10-11, 1973).
"' See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 77-78; J. POLE, supra note 18, at 27-28.
712 J. POLE, supra note 18, at 32.
73 H. APTHEKER, supra note 68, at 36. Aptheker offers a "Marxist interpretation" of the
colonial era and emphasizes class conflict. On social mobility in the 18th century, see J.
MAIN, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 164-96 (1965).




There is a romantic haze that surrounds our collective memory of
the frontier, some of it created by historians,.6 but there is nothing
mythical about the frontier's offer of social mobility. Frontier soci-
ety may have been materialistic and narrow-minded, and its pro-
fessed egalitarianism frequently a cover for envy and the pursuit of
private advantage, but opportunity was there for those who
would-and could-seize it."6
One such person was Andrew Jackson, whose name today de-
notes a political era. In Richard Hofstadter's view, Jackson typified
the Southwest's "peculiar blend of pioneer and aristocrat. 17 He
had risen from modest origins to economic success, political re-
ward, and the status of military hero.78 Jacksonian Democracy was
not a movement of levelers. When he issued his famous veto of the
bill to recharter the Bank of the United States, Jackson attacked
the "artificial distinctions" in government grants of "titles, gratui-
ties, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the po-
tent more powerful. '7 9 He agreed that natural differences among
people's talents and efforts would produce social distinctions under
"every just government" but argued that "every man is equally en-
titled to protection by law" in the exercise of his own talents8
Today Jackson's argument has a modern ring, but even in 1832 his
theme was already venerable: hostility to special privilege and de-
votion to equal opportunity under equal laws.
Half a century before, James Madison in The Federalist had
recognized that equal opportunity meant unequal results.8 1 Ameri-
cans have always understood that in a fair competition there will
be winners and* losers.82 What is remarkable is that this country
" The most celebrated of these historians, of course, was Frederick Jackson Turner,
whose work The Frontier in American History was published in 1920. See also J. A)Aiis,
THE EPIc OF AMERCA (1933).
7' See A. MooRs, THE FRoNIER Mm 246-47 (1957).
R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 26, at 57.
78 Id.
Id. at 77.
S0 This most-quoted paragraph of the Jackson veto message appears in id. at 77-7&
8 TH FEDERALI No. 10 (J. Madison).
" And, lest we wax too lyrical over the joys of equal opportunity, let us remember that
the losers in a perfect meritocracy have the knowledge that they lost fairly-so that they
have nothing to blame but their own failings. Bernard Williams, paraphrasing Kant, distin-
guishes "respect which is owed to each man as a rational moral agent," from admiration,
which is "commanded unequally" by persons of unequal talents. Williams, The Idea of
Equality, in PHmLosopHy, POLITICS AND SocIEry 110, 115 (P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds.
19831
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:245
has never been swept up by a political movement devoted to level-
ing.8s Reformers, from Jackson through the Populists and the
Progressives to the New Deal and the civil rights movement, have
focused on equal opportunity, an end to privilege.8 4 Americans ac-
1962) (emphasis in original). But the typical loser in a thoroughly meritocratic world will
not have read Kant. In other words, the effects of equal opportunity on the equal citizenship
value of self-respect are not wholly supportive. See generally R. SENNETT & J. Coun, TIE
HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS 29 (1973); M. YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 1870-2033
(1958); Schaar, Equality of Opportunity, and Beyond, in 9 NoMos: EQUALITY, supra note 19,
at 228. Even so, there is an important distinction to be made between status inequalities
that result from the unequal distribution of natural talents or motivation to achieve, and
status inequalities imposed by a system of caste. It is the difference between being "looked
down on for being unmusical or clumsy or bad at football or even morally wicked" and being
"looked down on for having black skins, or poor parents, or working-class accents." W. RUN.
CIMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JusTIcE 282 (1966).
Indeed, we treat the very word "leveler" as an epithet. See, e.g., Strong, Levellers in
Judicial Robes, 60 NEB. L. REV. 680 (1981). In particular, Professor Strong has in mind the
dissenting Justices in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and
their more successful state court counterparts in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d
1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), and Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (per
curiam) (supplemental opinion concerning remedy), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). But
the epithet seems stronger than those judges deserve. In all three cases, the states had
designed systems for collecting and distributing public funds, in which property owners in
poor districts paid high taxes in order to fund schools that had low per-pupil expenditure
rates, while rich districts levied low taxes and produced high per-pupil support. The judges
in question merely found that various constitutional guarantees required more equal bur-
dens and benefits under those state programs. This was hardly judicial enforcement of
"equality of condition"; on the contrary, these judges' votes fit comfortably within Andrew
Jackson's rejection of special governmental "privileges, to make the rich richer." See supra
note 80 and accompanying text. The judges deserve credit for recognizing that public educa-
tion, from its inception in America, has always been regarded as our primary institution
promoting equality of opportunity.
84 See J. BLUM, THE BURDEN OF AMERICAN EQUALITY 10-16 (1978); W.C. MCWILLIAMS,
supra note 30, at 542. Blum points out that our "folklore of deserved advances from rags to
riches" has depended on a supply of cheap labor at the bottom of the economic ladder: first,
indentured servants and slaves and, later, immigrants from Europe and elsewhere. J. BLUM,
supra, at 16-18; see also W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 134 (on the persistent social subordi-
nation of blacks).
On the relation of equality to enterprise and social mobility, see S. LIPsmr, Tn: FIrST
NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE passim
(1963); D. POTTER, supra note 13, at 111-27; R. WELTER, supra note 48, at 127-62, On mobil-
ity as an aspect of republicanism, see G. WooD, supra note 45, at 479-83.
It is noteworthy that the ideology of social mobility had no difficulty in surviving the
transition from the era of Social Darwinism to the Progressive era. See R. WIEDE, Tna
SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 133-95 (1967). The failure of the "have-nots" to press for
leveling is at least partly explained by the means available to the "haves" for influencing the




cept wide disparities in wealth and income, so long as the system
remains open and people at the bottom of the economic scale are
relieved from the kinds of deprivation that stigmatize or exclude
them from participation in society.8 5
The ideal of equal opportunity is well established as part of the
American tradition of constitutional equality. 6 From time to time,
and particularly in recent years, egalitarian rhetoric has extended
beyond equal opportunity to calls for a greater equality of out-
comes.8 7 (Of course, in a great many situations there is no clear
distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of result.
Education is one such situation.) Naturally, proposals for a greater
sharing of society's burdens and benefits find the "haves" more re-
ceptive during times of relative abundance than during times of
economic contraction. It is more than coincidence that the 1960's,
which saw the flowering of the civil rights movement, were also a
period of economic expansion. Even in good times, however, the
willingness of the "haves" to share their abundance has been lim-
ited; the polity-ever the domain of the "haves"-has never gone
in for massive redistribution of wealth. Yet calls for further equali-
zation of results persist, and if anything is certain about the na-
tion's egalitarian tradition, it is that tradition's dynamism, its ca-
pacity for evolution.
Some observers have looked at America's relatively high social
mobility and have mistaken it for "equality of condition." Alexis
de Tocqueville so characterized American society during the era of
Jackson;88 a Charleston newspaper article had said almost the
See Karat, Equal Citizenship, supra note 6, at 59-64; Michenan, The Supreme Court,
1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
H~Av. L. REv. 7 (1969).
8 The point is not that the tradition of constitutional equality somehow mandates free
market competition, as the dissenting Justices argued in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 US.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873), but rather that claims to equal opportunity-of the sort frequently
made by the modern civil rights movement-draw on a long-standing rhetorical tradition.
See, e.g., M. HARRiNGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962); C. JFNCKS, INEQuALITY (1972).
" A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AEimucA 3 (H. Reeve trans. & P. Bradley ed. 1945)
(1st ed. Paris 1835). De Tocquevill's entire work is centered on the subject of equality. Two
other Frenchmen made similar observations about American society in the late 18th and
early 19th centuries. J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, French-born but naturalized as an
American citizen, published his Letters from an American Farmer in 1782. In his chapter
"What is an American" De Crevecoeur describes, rather romantically, the transformation of




same thing during the Revolution: "[T]he people of America, are a
people of property; almost every man is a freeholder."8 Americans
have always been attracted to that sort of hyperbole, in spite of the
persistence of economic inequality and even poverty-and, worse,
an economic underclass largely defined by race. 0 Yet, behind this
yearning to believe a myth lies another sort of equality that has
more substance, an equality of status that transcends a person's
ranking on the economic scale. Of course we have our social dis-
tinctions, but, at least since Revolutionary times, Americans have
shown a remarkable degree of willingness to afford each other the
equal dignity that John Winthrop anticipated for New England. 1
Moreover, even when we are not behaving that way, most of us
profess that we are. If you were to stand on the street of an Ameri-
can city and ask any sizable group of people to tell you what is
distinctive about this country, the chances are that one frequent
response would be something like this: "Everyone here is as good
as anyone else."
There has been enough social mobility in American society, from
the colonial era to the present day, so that many of those who hold
positions of wealth and power have come from humble begin-
nings.92 Americans love winners but resent it when the winners put
[f]rom nothing to start into being; from a servant to the rank of a master; from being
the slave of some despotic prince, to become a free man, invested with lands... I
What a change indeed! It is in consequence of that change that he becomes an Amern.
can .... [H]e forgets that mechanism of subordination, that servility of disposition
which poverty had taught him .
J. DE CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 77 (1963) (1st ed. Dublin 1782).
Michel Chevalier visited the United States during the years 1833-1835, just after Do Toc-
queville's visit. Like De Tocqueville, he failed to see any poor apart from "the leprosy of
slavery" and "an imperceptible minority of dissolute or improvident persons." M. CHE.v^-
LIER, SOCIETY, MANNERS, AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 97 (J. Ward ed. 1969) (1st ed.
Boston 1839). He was also impressed with the dignity and self-respect of American farmers
and laborers. Id. at 413-15. These Europeans' vision may have been rose colored, but they
did no more than repeat what was an article of faith among the people they were describing.
See REMARKABLE PROVIDENCES 1600-1760, supra note 54, at 18-20. Americans both dis-
dained and coveted social status; the reality was not so much classlessness as social mobility.
See D. POTTER, supra note 13, at 91-110; G. WOOD, supra note 45, at 70-75.
8, G. WOOD, supra note 45, at 100 (emphasis in original).
90 "Americans extolled equality while living in a stratified society." J. MAIN, supra note
73, at 237.
91 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., REMARKABLE PROVIDENCES: 1600-1760, supra note 54, at 17-18 (quoting the
complaint of Nathaniel Bacon, a dissident Virginia politician, about "men in authority and
favor" who had seen a "sudden rise of their estates" in comparison with "the quality in
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on airs. There is some "old money" in this country, and there are
some people who behave deferentially in the presence of the rich
or the famous. But the ideal today remains what it was in 1780,
when a New Jersey newspaper expressed this vision of post-Revo-
lutionary society: "[O]ne should consider himself as good a man as
another, and not be brow beaten or intimidated by riches or sup-
posed superiority." 93 In our own time, another French visitor
looked at America and saw what De Tocqueville saw. Simone de
Beauvoir, like her predecessor, saw an ideal that was partly real-
ized, and she, too, overstated it as an absolute-but both she and
De Tocqueville did accurately capture the ideal. This is the way De
Beauvoir said it: "[T]he rich American has no grandeur; the poor
man no [servility]; human relations in daily life are on a footing of
equality ....
E. Immigrants and the Limits of Belonging
In the century between 1815 and 1914-between the final exile
of Napoleon and the First World War-fifty million people left
Europe.9 5 Thirty-five million of them came to the United States."
Most came from peasant villages where notions of political equal-
ity and social mobility were, to say the least, not well developed.
They had come to America not to build a "City on a Hill" but to
escape poverty, degradation, and even starvation. Once here, they
took jobs in the cities at the bottom of the economic scale or, in
the case of Scandinavians and many Germans, moved West into
farming and associated businesses.9 As a replacement for the se-
curity the villages had offered their ancestors, they banded to-
gether both geographically and socially.100 So it was for the first
which they first entered this country"). On the "mushroom gentry" of the Revolutionary
era, see G. WOOD, supra note 45, at 399.
93 G. WOOD, supra note 45, at 73.
" S. DE BEAuvouR, AMERICA DAY BY DAY 261 (1953).
"M. HANSEN, THE IMMIGRANT IN AMEiCuAN HISTORY 4 (1940).
Id. at 21.
This was John Winthrop's characterization in a 1630 sermon preached at sea to passen-
gers bound for the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Winthrop's point was that the colony, which
would be highly visible, must set an example for the rest of the world. The key paragraph is
quoted in D. BooRsTN, supra note 52, at 3.
0. HANDLIN, THE UPROOTED chs. 1, 8, at 7-33, 180-202 (2d ed. 1973).
"M. HANSEN, supra note 95, at 73.




But immigrants, by definition, are people who "get up and go."
They might begin by taking the jobs that native born Americans
scorned, but they believed their children would enter the competi-
tion at higher levels. So, although the immigrant might be at the
bottom of the heap, "he was a capitalist at heart,"10 1 believing that
equality of opportunity lay just down the road. Sadly, the second
generation often encountered resistance. Here is Oscar Handlin's
comment on the effects when a young man encountered one of
those help-wanted signs that ended with the words "No Irish Need
Apply": "The hurt would affect him, but also his father. It would
disclose to these immigrants . . . the limits of their belonging to
America. 10 2
Their belonging-that was the objective. And for millions of im-
migrants' children, belonging to America meant the agonizing deci-
sion to reject their parents' language and culture. The wider soci-
ety saw it that way, too. The public schools were to be the
instrument of assimilation.10 3 A social worker might look around
an apartment and write: "This family is not yet Americanized;
they are still eating Italian food.' 1 04 The idea of America as a great
"melting pot" expressed not merely the wish of the "older stock"
of Americans not to be disturbed by the ways of people from other
cultures, but also the craving of immigrants and their children to
belong, to be respected, responsible, participating members of the
American society. 0 5
President Franklin Roosevelt, who came from an old New York
Dutch family, once told the Daughters of the American Revolution
"that all of us, and you and I especially, are descended from immi-
grants and revolutionists.' ' 06 Today the point that Roosevelt was
making seems remote when we think of the descendants of immi-
grants from Europe. The overwhelming majority of those immi-
grants' great-grandchildren are today part of one national culture,
101 Id. at 85.
102 0. HANDLIN, supra note 98, at 239.
103 See F. FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 171-72 (1979); R. WIEBE, supra note 84, at 57-58.
1040. HANDLIN, supra note 98, at 252 (emphasis omitted).
300 Id. at 231-54.
106 N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1938, at 9, col. 1.
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wearing the same clothes, 10 7 watching the same television pro-
grams, eating the same Italian food as do we all. Further, although
there are still a significant number of European ethnic communi-
ties, on the whole the European assimilation is not an issue but an
accomplished fact. For millions of Americans of non-European ori-
gin, however, the issue of assimilation is a live one. To what extent
must they assimilate in order to belong as equal citizens? Our na-
tional experience with religious minorities suggests the availability
of another model of belonging: not fusion, but acceptance. There is
no reason why cultural diversity should be incompatible with full
and equal membership in American society.
F. Race and Caste
The story of race relations in our country is largely a story of
pain, and inhumanity, and guilt. Yet that very history has served
as the crucible for the American ideal of equal citizenship. The
first interracial encounters in the seventeenth century, of course,
brought the English settlers face to face with the people they
called Indians. By the end of the colonial era, the Indian popula-
tion in the Eastern seaboard states had been decimated by Euro-
pean diseases, by warfare, and even by massacre. 10 8 There were
some bright spots, as in Rhode Island,109 but the general record of
the treatment of Indians by whites, from colonial days to our own
days, is a national disgrace. Throughout the centuries, however,
whites maintained a grudging respect for the culture they were de-
stroying; the white man "did the Indian the honor of treating him
as an enemy." 10 Because the Indian tribes often fought back, it
was often necessary to negotiate with them and even conclude
treaties. Some Indians captured in war were taken as slaves, but
systematic enslavement of the indigenous population never hap-
pened here as it did in Latin America."'
One of the justifications sometimes offered for the early colonial
settlements was the purpose to Christianize the Indians. Similarly,
107 On the "democracy of clothing," see D. BoonsTzN, THE Aumwc'A THE DsocnxrAc
EXPERIENC E 91-100 (1973).
108 See H. APTHEKER, supra note 68, at 19-21.
10 See R. HARMIs, supra note 30, at 12; NV. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 70.
110 W.C. McWILLAMS, supra note 30, at 179.
2 For a comparison of British and Latin American slavery, see D. DAVIs, Im PRoaBW
OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 223-61 (1966).
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once black slavery had been introduced, churchmen in England
and America called for the Gospel to be spread to the slaves. Cot-
ton Mather, who today symbolizes rigid, authoritarian Puritanism,
did urge both slaves and indentured servants to obey their mas-
ters, but he also asserted the equality of slaves in the sight of God;
and-much to the consternation of most slaveowners-he urged
that slaves be converted and baptized. 112 The English Puritan
Richard Baxter said this to slaveowners in 1673: "Remember that
they are of as good a kind as you .... If their sin have enslaved
them to you, yet Nature made them your equals. Remember that
they have immortal souls, and are equally capable of salvation with
yourselves."1 '
That was the question: Were blacks the equal of whites? The
question goes to the heart of the American ideal of equality, and
three centuries later we are still trying to make good on that ideal.
The problem in race relations is, first and foremost, a problem in
inequality. It was the difference of blacks that the apologists for
slavery seized upon to justify treating blacks as less than fully
human."' And once slavery took hold, with men, women, and chil-
dren regarded as property to be bought and sold in the same way
that cattle are bought and sold, then the slaves began to appear to
be less than human.115 Stigma feeds on itself.11 6 The more the
slaves were debased, the more they were seen by whites as fit sub-
jects for debasement. The more unequal their treatment, the more
it seemed justifiable to set them apart as different.117 About twenty
years ago, in casual conversation, my friend Vaughn Ball put this
idea in words I shall never forget: "You can always forgive people
for what they do to you, but you can never forgive them for what
you do to them."
112 See W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 200-04.
113 Id. at 200 (quoting Richard Baxter). In response to increasing numbers of baptisms of
slaves, all Southern Colonies enacted statutes providing that a slave's status would continue
even after her baptism. See W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 181; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40,
at 74.
114 Winthrop Jordan's superb study, which focuses on the attitudes of whites toward
blacks, repeatedly offers evidence for the statement in the text. See, e.g., W. JORDAN, supra
note 18, at 91-98, 216-65, 304-08, 435-45, 482-541; see also W.C. McWILLIAMS, supra note 30,
at 174-77, 258-70.
"' W.C. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 276.
"e See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 5-6.
'" W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 274.
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The most serious wrong of the white majority has always been to
identify blacks as "them," to set blacks apart as a separate cate-
gory of beings. The infamy of the Dred Scott opinion'1 8 was pre-
cisely this: its bland assumptions of racial superiority, its shameful
equation of citizenship with whiteness.119 Ironically, the very exis-
tence of a racially identified underclass served to heighten the
sense of social equality among whites. Slaves were outside the
boundaries of the community, but the whites who were within it
could take pride in their equal membership status.12 0 As to the
slaves, however, it would have been ludicrous to speak of the val-
ues of equal citizenship. They were not respected as fully human,
were not participating members in society, were not treated as re-
sponsible persons. Slaves had no legal equality, no political equal-
ity, no equality of opportunity.' 21
Yet the idea that black and white souls were equal in God's sight
retained vigor, and in the eighteenth century was reinforced by a
secular humanitarianism that grew out of the European Enlighten-
ment. In Winthrop Jordan's words, "Empathy was of course a
strong element in humanitarianism, and empathy implied equality,
if only in a very limited sense.1 22 After the Revolution, seven
Northern states formally abolished slavery, and in New Hampshire
it was allowed to die a natural death.123 The Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 forbade slavery in the Northwest Territory.' 24
118 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
" Id. at 404-05, 407, 416. Before the Civil War, the Republican Party decried the Dred
Scott decision and called for Negro citizenship. See E. FoNER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
MEN 292-93 (1970).
120 See J. BLUM, supra note 84, at 3-4, 17-18; NV. JoRDAN, supra note 18, at 134; J. PoLp,
supra note 18, at 25.
121 See generally M. TuSHNET, THE AnMmcAN LAw OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860 (1981).
122 W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 365. On Quaker empathy and introspection concerning
slavery, see id. at 273-76.
123 Id. at 345; A. ZimvwRsurr, THE FimsT EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE
NORTH (1967). On the judicial interpretation of state constitutional "free and equal" clauses,
see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 42-61 (1975).
The eradication of slavery in the North was not accomplished all at once. In some states
"abolition" legislation did not apply to slaves then living, but only to their later-born de-
scendants. Significant numbers of slaves continued to live in the North until well into the
19th century, and even after they were free, blacks were subjected to racial discrimination in
all phases of Northern social and economic life, from segregated schools and horse cars to
discrimination in housing and employment. See generally L. LTWAcK, NoRm OF SLAVERY
THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at 97-99 (1961).
124 On the sectional bargaining that led to this provision, see W. JORDAN, supro note 18, at
19831
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At the Constitutional Convention, however, a bargain was struck
in order to get the Southern states to join the Union. The new
Constitution said nothing about abolition and postponed for
twenty years any legislation to end the slave trade.'25 In deciding
how to calculate the populations of slave states for determining
their representation in Congress, the Convention hit on a formula:
each slave was to count as three-fifths of a person. Speaking of this
arrangement in The Federalist, James Madison wrote that it was
entirely logical, viewing slaves as state law viewed them "in the
mixt character of persons and of property.' 2' The problem of race
relations in America has always revolved around the question
whether nonwhites are or are not to be treated as complete per-
sons, as the equals of whites.127
One of the standard features of war is wartime propaganda. We
say we are fighting for an ideal, and we come to believe it. Just as
the Revolution had been carried on in the name of liberty and
equality, so the Civil War produced volumes of egalitarian rhetoric,
much of which was taken directly from an antislavery movement
that had begun, mainly among Quakers, in the eighteenth cen-
tury. 2 " After the war, the major issue before the Reconstruction
Congress was the translation of the ideal of equality into institu-
tions that would govern human affairs. Not many in that Congress,
it would appear, really believed that blacks and whites should be
treated as equals in society, in the way you and I believe that.12 It
was a legal equality that they sought to achieve through the adop-
tion of civil rights laws and constitutional amendments. However,
they chose the broadest sort of language to express the substance
321-22.
'1" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
126 THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 368 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
127 See W.E.B. DuBois, THE CRISIS WRITINGS 57, 71, 89, 97, 105 (D. Walden ed. 1972),
128 See W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 195. Two persistent themes in antislavery rhetoric
were the right to equal laws and the "natural right" of a man to the fruits of his labor. See
Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513, 537-38 (1974).
'29 See generally R. BERGER, supra note 4; Roche, Equality in America: The Expansion
of a Concept, 43 N.C.L. REv. 249, 256-58 (1965). One need not accept Raoul Berger's conclu-
sions about the narrow purposes of the framers of the fourteenth amendment, see R. BR-
GER, supra note 4, at 5-10, in order to agree that the framers did not expect a revolutionary
change in race relations in the North. On Northern attitudes, see G. FREDRICKSON, TarE
BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 97-129 (1971); W. JORDAN, supra note 18, passim; L.
LITWACK, supra note 123, passim.
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of the fourteenth amendment-language fully capable of incorpo-
rating the values of equal citizenship. 130
It is a familiar story how the Supreme Court lent itself to a po-
litical process that accomplished the reconciliation of North and
South at the expense of the constitutional equality promised by
the Civil War amendments.13' But eventually the politics of the
country changed. Large numbers of blacks moved from the rural
South to the urban North and West, where they did vote and did
affect policy. The population movement was accelerated by the
Second World War, with its offer of employment in jobs from
which blacks had long been excluded. The war also produced its
share of propaganda: specifically, that we were fighting against the
Nazis and their hateful theories of racial superiority.132 The time
was ripe, once the war was over, for a major reassessment of race
relations. When the political branches of the national government
defaulted, the Supreme Court restored the values of equal citizen-
ship to our constitutional law. Throughout these dramatic decades
of constitutional change, the Court employed the rhetoric of equal-
ityl 3s-not merely because of the fourteenth amendment's histori-
cal origins, but also because equality was a rhetoric that precisely
suited the unconstitutionality of a system of caste.
There is no justification for complacency about these constitu-
tional developments. The pace of change in race relations in
America can seem rapid only to one who is not a victim of discrim-
ination. But if fulfillment of the ideal of racial justice is still an
urgent national need-and it is-then it is hard to see how the
ideal will be advanced by our abandoning the rhetoric of equality.
Other egalitarian issues in America's past have been left out of
this sketch. One notable omission is the status of women; the
reader can easily add to the list of missing motifs. Enough has
been said, however, to demonstrate beyond doubt that the emo-
tional force of the idea of equality in America derives not from the
130 See Karst, Constitutional Equality, supra note 6, at 11-21.
13 See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RuTnEas L REV. 387
(1967); see also Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 6, at 17-21.
132 For more than a hundred thousand American citizens of Japanese ancestry, uprooted
from their homes and "relocated" in camps, this particular bit of wartime propaganda had a
bitter flavor. See M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUA-
TION (1949); Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YAL LEJ. 489 (1945).
1 Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 6, at 21-38.
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fact that equality in the abstract is a truism or an empty tautol-
ogy" 4 but from the place of the ideal of equality in the hierarchy
of American "public values.' 35 The essence of the equality that
matters in America is the idea that "one person is as good as an-
other," that each of us is a respected participant in the society, a
member who counts for something. The symbols of equal member-
ship matter, too: what Max Weber rather slightingly called "for-
mal" equality'3 6-that is, equality before the law-is, in this per-
spective, not just a formality. Equal laws help to create equal
citizens.
III. EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
The equality that has acquired strong generative force in our
modern constitutional law is not the abstraction that likes should
be treated alike, but the principle of equal citizenship. That princi-
ple, which certainly does have substantive content, is easy to ex-
press in the language of rights.137 Why, then, should we continue to
talk about equality?
There are two excellent reasons, and they reinforce each other.
First, the rhetoric of equality leads lawyers and judges toward a
constitutional jurisprudence that responds to some of the nation's
most deeply held substantive values. Second, our constitutional
equality serves a fundamental social need, heightening our aware-
ness of interconnection. By reminding us that each of us belongs to
American society, the ideal of equality touches our sense of who we
are, as individuals and as a nation.
134 Cf Westen, supra note 8, at 547-48: "Equality is an undeniable and unchangeable
moral truth because it is a simple tautology." Westen further elaborates:
[B]ecause the proposition that likes should be treated alike is unquestionably true, it
gives an aura of revealed truth to whatever substantive values it happens to incorpo-
rate by reference. As a consequence, values asserted in the form of equality tend to
carry greater moral and legal weight than they deserve on their merits. That is why
arguments in the form of equality invariably place all opposing arguments on the
"defensive."
Id. at 593.
" On the role of the judiciary in articulating and implementing "our public values," in-
cluding the value of equality, see Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11-17 (1979).
236 M. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN EcONOMY AND SociETY 145, 355 (E. Shils trans. &
M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 8-16.
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A. Equality: From Rhetoric to Jurisprudence
0
Equality is a central theme in the native idiom of American cul-
ture. Lawyers and judges will go on using egalitarian rhetoric not
merely to exploit the constitutional doctrine founded on the text of
the equal protection clause but because they want to address live
legal issues in the language that most naturally expresses the sub-
stantive values underlying their claims and decisions. In constitu-
tional cases, the rhetoric of equality often includes the term "dis-
crimination," an idea that can be reduced to emptiness, just as
inequality can be, if it be treated as a formal term. But to speak of
inequality or discrimination in our society is not to speak of a for-
mality. It raises the emotional tone of discourse precisely because
it directs our thinking to questions that matter. It also helps us to
find answers that ring true.
It would be awkward to deal with a great many modern
problems of discrimination in the language of rights.138 Suppose a
state were to adopt a program of welfare assistance for the needy,
but limit the payment of benefits to white persons. The natural
approach to that law's unconstitutionality would focus on the ra-
cial discrimination, on the unequal treatment of nonwhites. It
would be possible to state the constitutional claim without men-
tioning the idea of inequality, but to do so would be indirect and
clumsy. There is no general constitutional right to welfare assis-
tance.139 Instead, we should have to talk about a right not to have
'33 The Supreme Court's equal protection decisions dealing with voting qualifications are
readily translatable into the language of "rights," such as the right to vote. Other aspects of
equal participation in the electoral process, such as the one-person-one-vote principle, or
guarantees of access to the ballot for minority parties, are slightly more awkward to trans-
late into "rights" terms, but the translation can be accomplished. See Westen, supra note 8,
at 563-64. But, just as certainly, some substantive constitutional rights, although not for-
mally expressed in the language of equality, rest in part on the values of equal citizenship.
The right of a woman to have an abortion, recognized by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is explained in the language of "privacy" and substantive due
process, id. at 152-62; yet the Justices surely understood that the availability of abortion
was, among other things, a feminist cause, touching the freedom of women to choose how
they would participate in society-and thus the status of women generally. The rhetoric of
equality does not solve the abortion puzzle, but it is useful in focusing discussion on one of
the important substantive values at stake in the abortion cases. See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 149-52.
139 In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), a closely divided Supreme Court held that
even previously earned social security benefits were not an "accrued property right," and
thus could constitutionally be denied to an alien deported for having been a member of the
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the state use race as a criterion for eligibility-which is to say a
right to be free from this particular form of racial discrimination,
or this particular form of racial inequality.
When the issue before a court involves racial equality,
moreoever, it may be quite inappropriate for the court to confine
its inquiry to the particular burden or benefit at stake in the case
at hand. Racial segregation, for example, was a system; both its
purposes and its effects went well beyond the sum of its parts.140
When those college students in Greensboro began their sit-in dem-
onstrations at lunch counters in 1960, they were not primarily
seeking sandwiches, or even the company of white patrons; what
they sought was the dignity of being treated as equals. The free-
dom riders knew that the back of the bus would arrive at the sta-
tion very soon after the front of the bus, but they had a more spiri-
tual destination. It would have made no sense whatever for the
courts to avoid the language of equality in dealing with Jim Crow,
because the point of Jim Crow as a system was to maintain the
inequality of black people in general. The main question in a seg-
regation case never was the right to sit in a particular place in a
courtroom, or a particular place on the beach. The central issue
raised by segregation was one of place-the place of blacks in soci-
ety. Were they to be treated as equals, or were they to continue to
be stigmatized as inferior, that is, to be set apart and treated as
not quite fully human?
Readers who are too young to remember how the police in Ala-
bama used dogs and electrified cattle prods against black civil
rights marchers 14 1 may have noticed a more recent event in Cali-
fornia. The Police Chief of Los Angeles, responding to a question
about the disparately large number of black people who had suf-
fered injury and death from police officers' choke holds, said he
had a "hunch" that blacks might be more susceptible to injury
Communist Party. Id. at 610-11, 621. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the
Court did not even mention any arguable claim of a constitutional right to state welfare
benefits, but treated the case as raising an equal protection question. Id. at 483.
11 See generally C. WOODWARD, THE STANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ad. 1966);
Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). Modern ra-
cism also has its cumulative, systematic aspects. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARe. L. REv, 1, 10-
11 (1976); Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 6, at 50-51.
"I On the use of dogs in Birmingham, see J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 201-05 (1981). On
the use of cattle prods in Selma, see id. at 260.
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from choke holds than were "normal" people. 142 Here we have a
textbook illustration of the definition of stigma, an extreme exam-
ple of lack of empathy.
When governmental officials explicitly, or otherwise deliberately,
impose unequal burdens on the members of a racial minority, it is
now received doctrine that the officials must offer compelling justi-
fication for their conduct. In varying degrees, too, the Supreme
Court has insisted on substantial governmental justification for de-
liberately unequal treatment based on other characteristics that
signify group membership: sex, alienage, illegitimacy.' 43 When the
constitutional claim is not that government has deliberately dis-
criminated but that its conduct has produced a racially dispropor-
tionate effect, however, the Supreme Court has recently been in-
hospitable.1" The line between those two phenomena, though, has
always been blurred, '45 and surely it is still a responsible form of
advocacy to argue that some racially disproportionate effects of
governmental action ought to be subjected to judicial scrutiny at a
level higher than minimum rationality.1 40
It would be unrealistic to expect this argument to persuade a
majority of the Supreme Court in the near future. Indeed, the per-
sistence of a racially identifiable economic underclass probably is
beyond the capacity of courts to remedy. Yet persistent articula-
tion of arguments addressed to "racially discriminatory impacts"
will serve to remind the makers of public policy that some kinds of
group inequalities deserve their attention. Anyone who agrees that
disproportionately high black unemployment and disproportion-
ately short black life expectancies are matters of urgency will do
well to think long and hard before abandoning the idea of equality
,4, L.A. Times, May 8, 1982, pt. II, at 1, coL 6.
143 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 62 (1977) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (sex); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (alienage).
,44 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979) (sex discrimination).
,,5 Justice Stevens called this point to the Supreme Court's attention in his concurring
opinion in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976). More recently, in Rogers v. Lodge,
102 S. Ct. 3272, 3282 (1982), he stated his opposition to the use of racially discriminatory
motive as the key to the unconstitutionality of racial voting dilutions.
146 See generally Brest, supra note 140, at 10-11, 22-52; Eisenberg, Disproportionate Im-
pact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36
(1977); Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 6, at 49-52.
1983]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:245
as part of the constitutional rhetoric that forms the background for
day-to-day governmental policy.
147
If these particular forms of racial inequality seem remote from
today's constitutional concerns, consider the incidence of the death
penalty in America. Is it not plain that one of the most telling ar-
guments against capital punishment is that it is visited dispropor-
tionately on blacks? When killings are analyzed according to the
races of the defendants and their victims, the pattern that emerges
is even more dramatically disproportionate. A black who kills a
white is the most likely to be executed; a white who kills a black is
extremely unlikely to be executed. 148 It is possible, in theory, to
address even this racial disparity in the language of rights. Yet to
discuss either the wisdom or the constitutionality of the death pen-
alty without using the rhetoric of equality would risk losing sight
of a central feature of the system: its systematic treatment of black
lives as if they were worth less than white ones.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly confronted these
concerns about racial equality in its opinions on the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty, there is reason to believe that the con-
"' These concerns illustrate how the distinction between equality of opportunity and
equality of condition is blurred. Virtually all inequalities of condition produce some degree
of inequality of opportunity. For example, one's opportunities to earn a living for one's fam-
ily are, to say the very least, correlated to one's lifespan and employment.
Race-conscious programs of affirmative action are examples of governmental policy to re-
dress group inequalities that are seen as the result of past societal discrimination against
racial and ethnic groups. See the various opinions of the majority Justices in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). It is not surprising that the Supreme Court has acquiesced
in this view of intergroup relations; its own notion of "suspect" classifications rests in part
on a similar premise about societal prejudice against groups of people, that is, that prejudice
imposes status inequalities (such as stigma) on members of those groups in general. See
generally J. ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DisTRusT 145-70 (1980); Brest, supra note 140, at 6-21.
On the persistence of substantive economic inequalities between blacks and whites, see E.
DORN, RuLEs Am RAcrAL EQUALITY 28-49 (1979).
148 A study briefly reported by Charles Black covered several Southern states, along with
Ohio. Professor Black reports that the results were similar in all states, with one minor
exception in Georgia. The probability of a death sentence after conviction for homicide in
Ohio, summarized by Professor Black, is as follows:
Black kills white .214
White kills white .056
Black kills black .017
White kills black .000
During the period studied, in Ohio there were 47 instances of whites killing blacks, and no
death sentences-a pattern repeated in "the great majority" of states studied. C. BLACK,
CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 101-02 n.2 (2d ed. 1981).
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cerns have influenced the Court's decisions. A few years ago the
Court held that the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" clause forbade imposition of the death penalty for
rape 49 Some years previously, Justice Marshall had written at
length about the disproportionate application of the death penalty
to poor people and members of minority groups, and had specifi-
cally quoted nationwide statistics showing that of the 455 people
executed for rape in the period 1930 to 1968, 48 were white and
405 were black.150 This egalitarian argument-that the death pen-
alty for rape was unconstitutional because of the racial discrimina-
tion that attended its application-had been raised repeatedly in
lower courts and in the Supreme Court."5' The rhetoric of equality
thus has its argumentative uses even when the courts are employ-
ing the language of rights to explain their decisions. Even the War-
ren Court's acceleration of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights
into the fourteenth amendment can be seen in a similar egalitarian
perspective. 52
The moral force of the rhetoric of racial equality in the death
penalty cases helps us to understand why constitutional claims of
equality often come to the Supreme Court with the force of a pre-
sumption behind them. The explanation is not to be found in any
moral axiom; it is that successive Supreme Court majorities have
discerned in the equal protection clause substantive values in tune
with the nation's long-developing egalitarian ideals. Not only the
celebrated activism of the Warren Court fits this characterization;
the Burger Court, too, has made its contributions to the process.
It is almost inconceivable that the Court could have accom-
plished anything like what it has done to promote the values of
equal citizenship if it had not been able to employ the rhetoric of
equality. Unquestionably, the Supreme Court has drawn not only
inspiration but political strength from the fact that its egalitarian
149 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
150 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
5 See generally M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNusuAL: THE SutPRU Cowti AND CAPrrAL
PUNISHMENT (1973). I am indebted to Catherine Hancock for recalling the Coker case and
the point illustrated by it to my frontal lobe.
"' See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natu-
ral-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 UCLA L. Rv. 716, 730-31 (1969).
" For example, apart from voting rights, the entire modern constitutional law of sex




decisions have been in tune with our long national tradition of
equal citizenship. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, called on
that tradition explicitly in holding unconstitutional the old Georgia
"county unit" electoral system, which diluted the voting strength
of urban areas in favor of rural counties: "The conception of politi-
cal equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nine-
teenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote. ' 15 4 When I was young and. thought I was tough-minded, I
scoffed at that language. Today it seems to me to make excellent
sense, not just as a political move but as an appropriate appeal for
recognition of a new stage of evolution of the American ideal of
equal citizenship.
That ideal does have political momentum, and the Supreme
Court's egalitarian decisions over the past three decades have doc-
trinal momentum. Lawyers and judges who want to promote the
values of equal citizenship cannot afford to abandon the constitu-
tional rhetoric of equality. 15  Imagine arguing a case involving dis-
crimination based on the status of illegitimacy and being told you
must not speak of inequality. There is no generalized constitu-
tional right to inherit or to receive damages under a wrongful
death statute or a workers' compensation law. To recast the claim
in the language of rights, you would have to speak of discrimina-
tion, which is to say unequal treatment. In a context like this one,
it is just not true that the idea of equality distracts us from the
real issue; the real issue here is the fairness of an inequality at-
tached to an ineradicable status, an inequality founded partly on
stigma and partly on similarly invidious legislative assumptions
supporting male domination over the women who bear their
children.15
15" Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1973).
155 Frank Michelman, who argued for a "rights"-oriented approach to constitutional pro-
tection of the poor, assumed continued use of the rhetoric of equal protection. See
Michelman, supra note 85, at 33 n.78.
"' There would be no logical impediment to use of the language of rights in dealing with
claims of discrimination based on illegitimacy, any more than there would be in cases of
discrimination based on race, or sex, or alienage, or any other analogous characteristic. If
we ask why sex discrimination should be analogized to racial discrimination, for example,
the answer begins in an inquiry into the substantive values at stake in the two types of
cases, and leads to the articulation of some general principle underlying both claims of right.
This substantive principle might be stated in the language of stigma, or respect, or citizen.
(Vol. 17:245
WHY EQUALITY MATTERS
Similarly, the constitutional claim of a homosexual who was de-
nied employment as a police officer surely would fare better as a
complaint against discrimination than as a right to be hired by the
police or to be a homosexual. The point is not that you are some-
how misleading the judge when you talk about equality. The equal-
ity argument quite properly focuses attention on a broad substan-
tive question that is not only real but important: the constitutional
legitimacy of using the status of homosexuality as the basis for un-
equal treatment across a wide range of state-controlled burdens
and benefits.157 This concern about relegating a group of people to
second-class citizenship has led some writers to suggest that gov-
ernmental classifications based on the status of homosexuality
should be regarded as constitutionally "suspect."o s
Both the illegitimacy and the homosexuality examples show that
the attraction of our long-standing national ideal of equality of op-
portunity is still strong. Why should an illegitimate daughter not
have the same start in life as her half-brother, merely because her
mother was not married to her father? Why should a homosexual
be denied the same chances for employment that others have? If
the state has justifications for its rules about inheritance or police
employment, let it come forward and present them. If, as I believe,
those efforts to justify will show that the discriminations are based
not on a dispassionate assessment of public need but on the stigma
of inferiority,15 9 then the claim of equal citizenship ought to
prevail.
The importance of the rhetoric of equality in constitutional ad-
judiciation is hard to overstate. Egalitarian rhetoric has appeal be-
cause it is the American political culture's natural language, and
because it addresses vital substantive values in American life. The
rhetoric forces judges and other governmental decision makers to
ship-in which case we should have come full circle to the substantive centrality of equal
membership in the society.
1'7 The wide range of disabilities imposed on homosexuals is itself an indication of a sta-
tus inequality; various specific inequalities are properly seen as flowing from a more general
disposition of the organized society to refuse to treat homosexuals as equals. The parallel to
Jim Crow is striking. The process of dismantling the legal structure on which this status
inequality rests is well underway, but a great many disabilities remain. See Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
15 See, e.g., L. Tiuaa, supra note 15, at 944-45 n.17.
29 See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 682-86 (1980).
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focus on issues that are real, and the rhetoric provides a founda-
tion in American tradition for decisions that promote the values of
equal citizenship. As the death penalty cases show, the rhetoric of
equality can even influence judges to accept constitutional claims
that are made in the language of rights. In other contexts, from the
freedom of speech to the freedom of intimate association, substan-
tive constitutional rights have been advanced in the name of equal-
ity.16 0 In the modern constitutional era, equality has been the cut-
ting edge of freedom.
B. Constitutional Equality: Being and Belonging
As a principle of constitutional adjudication, equality not only
helps a court to focus on the right questions and to reach the right
conclusions, but serves another function as well. This function can
be seen narrowly as an institutional one, affecting the judiciary's
relations with the political branches of government. But if we pur-
sue the institutional inquiry far enough, we discover a much larger
question about the underpinnings of our national community. In
this perspective, constitutional equality can be seen as part of the
social cement that holds our nation together.
The beginning point is Justice Jackson's well-known remark that
the courts generally should be more receptive to claims under the
equal protection clause than they are to due process claims:
Invalidation of a statute or ordinance on due process grounds
leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many
people find objectionable.
Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other
hand, does not disable any governmental body from dealing
with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition
or regulation must have a broader impact. . . . This equality
is not merely abstract justice. . . . [T]here is no more effec-
tive practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed gen-
erally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action
16' See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1
(1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); see also Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 20 (1975).
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so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only
a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape
the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better mea-
sure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws
be equal in operation.161
Justice Jackson thus made two points about the relation of consti-
tutional equality to the role of the courts in the governmental sys-
tem. First, invalidating a law on an equal protection ground leaves
room for the legislature to maneuver. Second, when the legislators
decide on their response, they must confront the fairness of the
proposed regulation in the knowledge that an effective constitu-
ency is looking over their shoulders.
Professor Westen, in arguing that equality should be eliminated
from our storehouse of constitutional ideas, says that Justice Jack-
son's first point is illogical. Either the substance of the claim to
equality is the same as some substantive right, in which case the
court must offer the same remedy whichever constitutional norm it
chooses, or the substance of the equality claim differs from the
claimed substantive right, in which case, Professor Westen says,
the court "must enforce not whichever norm it prefers but which-
ever norm the entitled party demands."1'6 2 This argument rests on
a mistaken assumption. A party is not entitled to a norm; all a
litigant can legitimately expect is a judgment. Consider how an ap-
pellate court would respond to this argument: "The trial court
gave us the relief we asked for, but its opinion stated the wrong
reason." 163 The litigants are, of course, entitled to a judgment that
does no violence to a norm, but when they ask the court to forbid
the enforcement of an invalid law, an injunction gives them all
they need and all they are entitled to have.
In a great many cases the parties offer multiple constitutional
grounds for invalidating a law. Often a court faced with such an
array will conclude that one of the grounds is persuasive and will
say that it need not consider the other grounds. As Justice Jackson
181 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
16H2 Westen, supra note 8, at 588.
163 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogoan, 102
S. Ct. 3331, 3335 n7 (1982), stated. "[W]e review judgments, not statements in opinions."
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understood, the Supreme Court frequently has a considerable
range of choice in such matters. 16 4 Should it rest a decision on a
well-established, narrow ground, or on a broader ground that
makes new law? Should the opinion confront the legislature di-
rectly, or merely give the legislature some opportunity for recon-
sideration?6 " Not every claim to equality offers the same range of
choice to the Court, s6 but a great many of them do. There is obvi-
ous attraction in a constitutional ground that throws the political
initiative back to officials who are elected. The Court's constitu-
tional function, as Henry Hart remarked a generation ago, is not
only to prevent abuses of power by government, but also to elicit
"the affirmative, creative performances upon which the well-being
of the society depends. ' 167
Once a law has been invalidated on equal protection grounds,
the legislature, too, has a wide range of possible responses. It is not
forced to choose between imposing the very same regulation on ev-
eryone or abandoning its goals. Those goals may be attainable by
other means. The governmental system needs this sort of flex-
ibility. We have long recognized that much of our constitutional
law places the courts in the position of making judgments that are
essentially legislative. The language used to describe the various
standards of judicial review is illustrative; legislative choices are
implicit in such terms as "important" or "compelling" state inter-
ests. The judiciary and the political branches of government are
engaged in a cooperative lawmaking venture, and Justice Jackson
was right in assuming that the courts' readiness to cooperate could
be signaled by the rhetoric of equal protection.6es
Justice Jackson's second point is every bit as important as his
first one. Here he is no longer discussing how courts should try to
I Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (Stanley struck down statute prohibiting possession of obscenity in the privacy of
the home, but Mapp avoided issue of constitutionality of statute prohibiting possession by
excluding evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment).
115 In some cases, invalidation of legislation on equal protection grounds will limit legisla-
tive choice as much as invalidation on due process grounds. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 221-28 (1962).
I" For an example of a case that does not properly offer such a range of choice, see Wes-
ten, supra note 8, at 589-90. Professor Westen's example is adapted from the facts of Stan-
ton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
167 Hart, Comment, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 139, 141 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956).
1" See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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get along with legislatures; he is suggesting one way for the judici-
ary to help produce laws that are fair. He might have used the case
of Skinner v. Oklahoma69 as an example. In that case the Su-
preme Court held invalid a state law requiring the sterilization of
anyone convicted three times for felonies, but exempting convic-
tions for violating prohibition laws or tax laws, or for committing
embezzlement or political offenses. 17 0 The Court had several doc-
trinal avenues open before it. The law might be invalidated on
equal protection grounds (because one of Skinner's crimes was lar-
ceny, and an embezzler would not be sterilized); or on grounds of
substantive due process (because it was irrational to suppose that
criminal traits were inherited); or on procedural due process
grounds (because Skinner had not been given an opportunity to
refute the assumption that he had inheritable criminal traits).'
The Court chose the equal protection ground and said that larceny
and embezzlement were "intrinsically the same quality of offense,"
and that the state's determination to sterilize one type of offender
and not the other worked an "invidious" discrimination.
17 2
Now, Skinner was a plain case of constitutional overkill; the
opinion might easily have avoided all mention of equality and
rested on a right not to be sterilized unless the state demonstrated
some compelling justification.1 Yet the rhetoric of equality also
made sense. This was class legislation, based on the odious as-
sumption that middle-class felons made better breeding stock than
did thieves who were less genteel. The exempted felonies were
white-collar crimes, including such political offenses as bribery-a
matter perhaps not entirely beyond the awareness of legislators.
The Court implicitly spoke to the Oklahoma legislature as Justice
Jackson might have spoken:17 4 Consider the political consequences
of extending this sterilization law to white-collar felonies; then, if
you do extend the law, we can decide whether due process forbids
169 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
170 Id. at 542.
171 Chief Justice Stone, concurring, would have rested decision on this procedural due
process ground. See id. at 543, 544.
272 316 U.S. at 541.
17 No doubt both Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Stone shied away from this doctrinal
path because the Court had only recently extricated itself from what the Justices saw as the
swamp of substantive due process.
174 Justice Jackson did concur in Skinner and noted his agreement both with Justice
Douglas and with Chief Justice Stone. 316 US. at 546.
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that form of punishment. 17 5
The rhetorics of rights and equality do not pose an "either-or"
choice; both are needed in the defense of constitutional values, in-
cluding the values of equal citizenship. But the language of equal-
ity serves, in a way that language of rights does not, to focus the
institutions of government on issues raised by relations of groups
of people to each other. Although every claim of a right does iden-
tify a group, 1 7 the discussion of a claim in "rights" terms is apt to
proceed along lines that ignore groups and emphasize individuals.
Correspondingly, although the claim of constitutional equality is
"a personal one, '1 77 the fact that the equal protection clause was
part of our nation's constitutional response to black slavery influ-
ences us to think of claims to equality in terms of intergroup rela-
tions.17 8 In the circumstances of Skinner,1 79 for example, the rheto-
ric of equality was also a lesson in empathy. The legislators were
invited to think of themselves in the position of the class of people
who might be sterilized. They were invited to see the issue of ster-
175 The legislature might be expected to seek other ways of punishing repeat offenders. In
fact, four decades have passed since the Skinner decision, and the Supreme Court still has
not had to decide on the scope of the constitutional freedom from forced sterilization. Un-
doubtedly, there is a strong substantive due process claim in such a case.
170 The individual making the claim asserts that his or her characteristics satisfy the con-
ditions for being relieved of a burden or for receiving a benefit. Those characteristics, In
turn, define a group consisting of all persons who share them.
177 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
178 See generally Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107
(1976). Every claim to equality, too, identifies a group. Douglas Rae, in his exceptionally
valuable recent analysis of the many varieties of inequality, somehow misses this point. In
his discussion of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Professor Rao
calls Alan Bakke's constitutional challenge to the university's racial admissions quota for
one of its medical schools an individual claim to equality, as opposed to the group claim
being raised by minority applicants. D. RAE, EQUALrriES 4-5 (1981). Bakke, however, was
claiming admission on the basis of his undergraduate grades, test scores, and the like. That
claim identified a group, consisting of all the persons with similar qualifications. Bakke was
no more (and no less) claiming an individual right than was the black applicant whose
blackness identified a group.
The Bakke case illustrates a general point made by Professors Kurland and Weston and
Rae, along with other writers: that the rhetoric of equality frequently appears on both sides
of a dispute. See Kurland, supra note 7, at 165; Rae, supra, at 148-49; Westen, supra note 8,
at 581-84. Both Bakke and the minority applicants to the medical school were appealing to
principles of equality; the two visions of equality were invested with different-and compet-
ing-substantive contents. Equality as a formal abstraction has nothing to offer to the solu-
tion of cases like Bakke; the principle of equal citizenship, however, is more illuminating.
See Karat, Equal Citizenship, supra note 6, at 52-53.
179 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
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ilization not merely as a question concerning relations between the
state and an individual, but also in the light of the way groups of
people are related to each other.
Whatever one may think about the question whether constitu-
tional claims to racial equality should be seen as group claims or
individual claims-and what I think is that the question typically
presents a false dichotomy 80-- it is important for judges and other
policy makers to be concerned about the relations among groups,
and particularly about the perceptions and interactions of groups
defined by race. These concerns about interracial relations illus-
trate a larger role for law, and especially constitutional law, in
American society. Not only does our constitutional law serve as
background for the making of public policy; it also affects the tone
of myriad day-to-day dealings among people. Thurman Arnold
once said that "'[1]aw' is primarily a great reservoir of emotionally
important social symbols"1' 1-a remark that is especially apposite
to constitutional guarantees of equal protection. The Brown82 de-
cision did influence the organization and operation of our public
schools, but surely the decision is chiefly important for its contri-
butions to the way all of us-blacks and whites and others-have
come to perceive each other and our common membership in a na-
tional community. Both the rhetoric of rights and the rhetoric of
equality contribute to this larger social process; the two rhetorics
150 A person's claim to be free from racial discrimination is undoubtedly the claim of an
individual to be treated "equally," regardless of race. Racial discrimination, by definition, is
unequal treatment based on the victim's identification as a member of a racial group. More
importantly, the reasons why our modem constitutional law is attuned to the redress of
racial discrimination trace their origins to a history of race-based slavery and discrimination
against blacks as a racially defined underclass.
The chief harms of racial discrimination and sex discrimination lie in the imposition of
stigma and the creation of stereotype. These intrusions on the values of equal citizenship
are enough by themselves to demand justification-and, failing justification, redress for the
individuals so harmed. See Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 Onio ST. LJ. 131, 140-41
(1981). But the very concepts of stigma and stereotype are inseparable from the stigmatized
or stereotyped individuals' group membership; the victims are dehumanized precisely be-
cause they are denied their individuality and treated according to race, sex, etc. See R.
ELLISON, INVImLE MAN (1952); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu-
tional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1074-75 (1980). Whether or not the idiom of "suspect
classification" be used, the courts must take groups into account in determining how much
justification to demand for any governmental conduct that discriminates on the basis of a
trait that defines a group. See also supra note 178.
181 T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBoLS OF GOVRN Vx 34 (1935).
182 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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contribute in different ways, however, and it would be costly to
dispense with either one.
Ultimately, the emotional force of constitutional equality as an
American ideal derives from two sets of feelings about ourselves in
relation to our fellow citizens: first, the sense of individual identity
and worth and, second, the sense of community.
The importance of empathy to the potential victims of stigma is
obvious, 183 but the values of equal citizenship are precious to all of
us in holding our community together. Ironically, every success of
the ideal of equal opportunity in a market economy heightens our
society's tendencies toward fragmentation. The addition of high
technology, with its increasing specialization of function, presses us
toward even further fragmentation. With every passing year the
sense of community seems harder to maintain. Of course, the rhet-
oric of equality-just because it is, in its modern form, the culmi-
nation of a long tradition-helps to bind us together.18 4 But the
same can be said for any traditional value that is deeply held.
What is special about our ideal of constitutional equality is that,
unlike such ideals as individualism or freedom, it stands as a con-
stant reminder of our connections to each other. Justice Jackson,
when he wrote of the relation between justice and the sharing of
burdens,18 5 was touching the edges of a deep social need. It is not
just the religious dissenters, the immigrants, the racial and ethnic
minorities who need to belong.18 6
Our legal institutions, and our courts in particular, have a spe-
cial role to play in nourishing a national community, and the idea
of equality is critical to their performance of that role. As Napo-
leon knew, the process begins in laws that are universally applica-
'" There is an enormous literature on the demoralizing effects of the stigma of inferiority.
The treatment of the subject by black writers is particularly valuable. See, e.g., J. BALDWIN,
THE FIRE NExT TIM (1963); K. CLARK, DARK GHETo (1965); W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK FOLK
THEN AND Now: AN ESSAY IN THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE NEGRO RACE (1939);
W.E.B. DuBois, THE SouLs OF BLACK FOLK (1903); R. ELLISON, supra note 180; E. FRAZIER,
THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNrrED STATES (rev. & abr. ed. 1948); W. GRIER & P. CODnS,
BLACK RAGE (1968); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1964).
14 See generally R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 45-74 (1953).
' See supra text accompanying note 161.
'6 "The quest for community will not be denied, for it springs from some of the powerful
needs of human nature-needs for a clear sense of cultural purpose, membership, status,
and continuity." R. NisBEr, supra note 184, at 73. "Some kind of answer to the question
Where do I belong? is necessary for an answer to the question Who am I?" H. LYND, ON
SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTrrY 210 (1958).
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ble.15 7 The ideal of "Equal Justice Under Law," however, implies a
concern for something more than regularity, as Justice Black rec-
ognized when he spoke of "equal justice for poor and rich, weak
and powerful alike." ' 8 There is emotional power in Justice Black's
words, and emotion is one of the essential ingredients of
community.
Our courts perform a special function in promoting the sense of
community, a function that legislative bodies cannot easily per-
form. In large measure, our legislatures are political marketplaces,
where private interests are aggressively pursued. Yet all of us rec-
ognize that as individuals we have other impulses that are not ag-
gressive but communitarian. In fact, one reason why we are con-
tent to allow relatively free rein to majority rule in our
legislatures" 9 is that we know that the courts, whose members are
relatively insulated from day-to-day partisan politics, will restrain
the majority's worst excesses, in the name of the constitutional val-
ues that define our national community.190 The rhetoric of equality
expresses one of those community-defining values. Furthermore,
our constitutional doctrines of equality offer our courts opportuni-
ties to make practical contributions toward promoting a national
community by protecting the various particular rights of equal
community membership.
In calling attention to expressions of our national ideal of consti-
tutional equality from the colonial era to our own day, I have em-
phasized the struggles of "outsiders"--religious dissenters, immi-
grants and their children, black people and other racial and ethnic
minorities-for inclusion as full-fledged members of the society.
We add to the list of such outsiders in every generation. As this
catalogue of diversity suggests, in one perspective America has al-
See Linpens, supra note 50, at 104.
18 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). No doubt a similar sentiment was felt by
those who disapproved of the pardoning of a President for acts that had caused some of his
subordinates to go to jail.
'89 Commentators have called attention to some of the limitations on simple mnjority rule
in the United States Congress, and, to a lesser extent, in the state legislatures. See J.
CHOPER, JuDIcIAL RxVmw AND THE NATIONAL PoLrCAL PROCSS:! A FuncoS1 RncoNsm-
ERATION OF THE ROLE OF Thm SUPREmE Comur 60-128 (1980); Wellington, The Nature of
Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 488-91 (1982).
190 I have made these points previously, in greater detail, in Karat, Equality and Commu-
nity: Lessons from the Civil Rights Era, 56 NOTRE DAMS LAw. 183, 205-07 (1980), and
Karst, Constitutional Equality, supra note 6.
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ways been what Robert Wiebe calls a "segmented society."19 1 Pro-
fessor Wiebe is correct in saying that citizenship, in the formal
sense, has never quite implied full membership in American soci-
ety: "Actual membership was determined by additional tests of re-
ligion, perhaps, or race or language or behavior, tests that varied
considerably among segments and over time. Each generation
passed to the next an open question of who really belonged to
American society. ' 192 Our "moral ideal" 193 of equal citizenship, in
other words, has never quite been matched by our behavior. But
the moral ideal has remained and gathered strength over the gen-
erations. Today the ideal of equal citizenship is itself widely
shared, across many of the social and political lines that otherwise
divide us. 194 The newly arrived-I use the term metaphorically, to
embrace not only immigrants but the whole range of groups seek-
ing recognition of equal citizenship-state a claim that nearly all of
us can understand, because we are all the descendants of the newly
arrived.195 When those groups make their claims in the language of
equality, they touch an experience that all of us can share: the ex-
perience of becoming, and belonging.
Six decades ago Benjamin Cardozo, then a judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, gave a series of lectures at Yale on the
nature of the judicial process.196 He entitled his first lecture The
Method of Philosophy. The second one was called The Methods
of History, Tradition and Sociology. When Cardozo referred to
philosophy as a judicial method, he had in mind the derivation of
decisions from authoritative sources of law. Although he did differ-
entiate philosophy from history and tradition, he understood that
philosophy's function was not exhausted in formal logic, but ex-
tended to the kind of intuition we call analogy.19 7 Formal analysis
191 R. WIEBE, THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEANING O AMERICA
(1975).
192 Id. at 95.
M See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 245 (1973) (borrowing the term "moral ideal"
from H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 177 (1961)).
14 See Wellington, supra note 193, at 245.
"' The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has embraced another sort of
"newly arrived"-the person who has recently moved from one state to another. See Zobol
v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
B. CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
' Id. at 49: "The method tapers down from the syllogism at one end to mere analogy at
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does have its place in law. When we think about issues of constitu-
tional equality, it is not only useful but essential to keep in mind
that the abstraction, equality, requires the addition of substantive
content to give it life.19 In logic, the formal idea of equality is,
indeed, empty.199
As Cardozo knew, however, American judges are not philoso-
phers, seeking to stand apart from the world they analyze. Michael
Walzer recently said, "One can imagine a philosopher-judge, but
the union is uncommon. Judges are in an important sense mem-
bers of the political community .... [J]udges are supposed to be
wise in the ways of a particular legal tradition. 200 By any sensible
application of the methods of history and tradition, the idea of
equality carries more than a formal meaning in America. Our ideal
of constitutional equality is, and will continue to be, a powerful
generative tradition in American life and American law.
Cardozo elaborated his thesis in four lectures. The great cellist
Pablo Casals-one of the countless millions of foreigners who have
enriched our nation-stated a similar thesis much more simply. He
said, "Think of the music, not the notes."
the other."
198 If anyone had any doubt of this proposition, surely Professor Westen's two articles
must lay those doubts to rest. See Westen, supra note 8; Westen, supra note 16.
"' Obviously, reasoning by analogy also requires the addition of substantive content, so
the court can determine what kinds of similarity are relevant, that is, which "competing
examples" should be selected to govern the case at hand. See generally E. LE, AN Ihmo-
DUCTMON TO LEGAL REASONING (1949),
200 Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 PoL. THEORY 379, 388 (1981); see also Brest,
Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpreta-
tion, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 739 (1982); Fiss, supra note 135.
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